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Abstract: This paper explores one particular dimension of broader global
policy issues concerning water resources: the regulatory governance
aspect of delivering water services to ordinary citizens in urban contexts
for domestic use. Water provision, as with many other areas of collective
provision, is increasingly shaped by attempts to embed social facets into
the expansion of transnational markets: part of the incremental growth of
‘globalisation with a human face’. The paper first summarises nascent
transnational institutional developments in policymaking and provision
around urban water services delivery. It stresses that this process is still
heavily dependent on national and local state institutions, particularly
domestic regulatory institutions.
The paper then elaborates a theoretical framework frames empirical
findings from case studies of the regulatory governance of water services
in Bolivia, Chile and Argentina during the 1990s and early 2000s. These
case studies illustrate how transnational dynamics create a regulatory
intersection of social policy and global governance. This pattern could be
emblematic of potential trajectories of transnational regulatory politics in
areas beyond water (most obviously other public utilities such as gas and
electricity, but also health and education).
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COMPARATIVE REGULATORY REGIMES IN WATER
SERVICE DELIVERY: EMERGING CONTOURS OF
GLOBAL WATER WELFARISM?
Bronwen Morgan*

I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of scarce water resources has emerged as a global policy
issue of significant prominence over the past five to ten years. In
particular, access to water understood broadly has arguably become a
flashpoint issue for debates over the social dimensions of globalisation. In
popular discourse, this debate focuses on whether a ‘human face’ to
globalisation can be successfully crafted at the transnational level, or
whether globalisation needs to be rolled back, and distributive and equality
issues can be tackled within national boundaries. This paper explores a
very specific dimension of the broader question of access to water:
namely, the delivery of water services to ordinary citizens in urban
contexts for domestic use. Rather than focusing on water resources
(irrigation, cross-border river basins, etc), it narrows its lens to the
question of access to sufficient clean water for domestic human use.1 This
is perhaps the most urgent ‘social’ question within global water policy
debates, as 1.2 billion people worldwide still lack access to minimal
amounts of safe drinking water, though the seventh Millenium
Development Goal hopes to halve this number by 2015. Of course, the
provision of access to domestic drinking water is intimately linked to the
quantity and quality of water resources more broadly, which are under
pressure – some would say in crisis (Davis 2007) – from rapid
urbanization in developing countries, from degraded infrastructure in
developed countries and from pollution in both settings. But the angle of
*
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The focus is also on urban rather than rural contexts, meaning that the analysis largely
excludes issues pertaining to water needed for subsistence food provision.
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analysis for present purposes is upon the delivery of essential services and
not on the larger ecological picture.
The key transnational actors in this particular aspect of access to water
debates are i) international and regional financial institutions who fund the
provision of water services on the assumption of a certain model of
delivery; ii) multinational companies from the UK and France wishing to
invest in foreign markets; and iii) institutions for dispute resolution,
particularly international arbitration forums and potentially the World
Trade Organisation under the auspices of the General Agreement on Trade
and Services. In the 1990s, transnational markets for water services
delivery developed, led by by British and French companies. Suez
(Ondeo), Vivendi (Veolia) and Thames are the three largest water service
operators globally in absolute terms as well as in terms of foreign
investment. These multinational companies entered into transnational
contracts with national or local authorities that, in turn, often provided for
international arbitration. The most important domestic actors for the
purposes of this paper are regulatory agencies and organised social groups
who contribute citizen and consumer perspectives – sometimes hostile – to
the institutional innovation of the agency. Both the regulatory agencies
and the organised social groups have transnational epistemic communities
that support their goals, but for the most part, these networks have not
played a causal role in the events explored in this paper. Rather, they are
networks whose transnational strength and depth are constituted by the
events. This is an important facet of the findings in this paper: that
transnational transformations are a product of the local and often not – or
not only – an effect of external influences on a state.
This growth of a transnational dimension to water services provision –
particularly marked in the 1990s but still highly politically salient – has
led to both resistance and routinisation. Activists’ challenge to market-led
capitalism is summed up in the cry of ‘water is a human right, not a
commodity’. In response, water provision, as with many other areas of
collective provision, is increasingly shaped by attempts to embed social
facets into the expansion of transnational markets: part of the incremental
growth of ‘globalisation with a human face’. In this way, the delivery of
essential services has become an arena for struggles over distributive
justice, a site for social policy just as much as for economic or industrial
policy (Dubash 2005), rooted in what could be called ‘the politics of
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necessity’ (Morgan and Trentmann 2006). In particular, the increasingly
transnational dimensions of water services delivery and its associated
policy debates mean that the politics of necessity are embedded in NorthSouth tensions typical of a range of issues in contemporary global political
economy. I would suggest that the narrative of this paper is emblematic of
potential trajectories of transnational regulatory politics in areas beyond
water, most obviously other public utilities such as gas and electricity, but
also health and education. In other words, the issue of access to water is in
effect a case study that exemplifies the regulatory dimensions of a debate
over whether it is possible to integrate social policy effectively into global
governance.
This paper tests the expectation that similar regulatory dynamics might be
expected to emerge in response to transnational influences on the domestic
delivery of water services, and finds that on the contrary, national
variations remain deeply embedded. This is illustrated with reference to
the dynamics of domestic (national-level) regulation of access to water
issues in Chile, Bolivia and Argentina in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Institutions that regulate essential services have emerged and spread
widely since the 1990s (Levi-Faur) in the context of a relatively strong
international mainstream consensus about their shape and purpose that I
call a ‘transactional’ model of regulation. This consensus is embedded in
strong transnational epistemic communities specialising in the technical
aspects of regulation, and arguably, a noticeable imitation effect,
(particularly in Latin America where the case studies explored here are all
located). Against this, the strategic and cultural centrality of access to
water might well lead national and local governments to focus strongly on
retaining national or local control: an orientation which fits more closely
with a ‘political’ model of regulation.
The findings of this paper indicate that in each of the three case studies,
control is in fact partially ceded to semi-independent regulatory
institutions that strongly resemble the institutional recommendations of the
transnational consensus. But an exploration of the implementation
dynamics of these institutions, focused on a time in each of conflict and
disputing, reveals significant national differences. In Bolivia, the role
played by the regulator in each case is coherent with the: transactional
model but is politically marginalised; in Chile, a strongly transactional
regulator maintains political salience, and in Argentina, a more political
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model of regulation is erratically salient. These differences can be
explained by integrating political dimensions at two levels which the
transactional model of regulation either sidesteps or demonises. The first
level is that of contingent events at the macro-level: thus Bolivia has
experienced a social and political revolution of sorts over the period
studied, while Argentina has experienced an economic crisis and a divided
state, and Chile remains a stable, depoliticized, investment-friendly
context. At a related, but more micro, level, the political context in each
country varies, particularly the strength of the social groups that contest
the transactional model of regulation promoted by the dominant
transnational epistemic community. These two levels interact to suggest
that there are two broad competing models of global governance that
shape domestic regulatory dynamics, both of which stem from a mix of
local, national and transnational influences: The first, managed
liberalisation, has been dominant thus far, but the second, a reinvigorated
image of public provision that stresses participatory democracy rather than
bureaucratic state involvement (Morgan 2006a), is gaining prominence.
Figure 1 summarises the operational roles of the regulator in each case
study with particular reference to the role of transnational influences.
Figure 2 summarises key aspects of the broader political context which
help to explain the variation illustrated in Figure 1. The remainder of this
paper will flesh out these tables in three parts. First, I outline the contours
of global water welfarism and in particular the place of regulation within
those contours. Second, I explore the reverberations of ‘missing politics’
in the three case studies of Chile, Argentina and Bolivia. Finally, the paper
concludes by highlighting the implications of the case studies for our
understanding of transnational transformations of the state.
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Figure 1: Operational comparison of national regulatory dynamics
Bolivia

Chile

Argentina

Catalyst for private Social goals and
sector participation international pressure
(PSP)
(IADB)

Economic goals and
international incentives
(WTO)

President Menem’s
reforms

Timing and level of Just before PSP
government
Central

9 years before PSP
Central govt

With PSP
Provincial

Role and texture of Basic technical expertise, Expert technocracy, low
regulator
inadequate legal
discretion, relatively
structure, independent
independent

Low on expertise, played
populist role

International
arbitration?
Overall

Yes

Yes

No

Some formal technical Formal and substantive
capacity from a
transactional capacity;
transactional
politically salient
perspective; politically
marginalised

Politicised; salient when
catalysed by
ombudsman

Figure 2: Contextual comparison of national regulatory dynamics
Bolivia (transactional
but marginalised)

Key focus of broad Legislative framework
regulatory dynamics for water resources
broadly: irrigation,
mining
‘Main action’

Chile (transactional and
politically salient)

Procurement policies, tariff- Legislation mandating
setting and accounting
social tariffs
processes, mergers

Popular politics and mass Legalised power struggles
mobilisation, legislative between major interests;
negotiations
limited, ineffective party
politics

Principal source of Deliberative and
rich data
participatory drafting;
social control of
company
Implicit social
Politically driven local
imaginary
development

Argentina
(politicised but –
erratically – salient)

Mix of party politics and
popular action, and small
claims lawsuits

Regulator-company disputes Ombudsman-courtwithin regulator and in court regulator sequence

Legalistic public interest

‘Popcorn’
incrementalism’

6

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 04 NO. 07

II. REGULATION IN THE SHADOW OF GLOBAL WATER
WELFARISM
The structure of global water policy is complex, but can be presented for
present purposes as a simplified model that focuses on the regulation,
provision and policymaking environment of urban water services.2 There
are no formal international institutions responsible for the regulation of
water services at the global level. Moreover although transnational
companies are involved in the provision of water services, from a formal
perspective and especially from a perspective of legal rights and
obligations, water service delivery is still deeply embedded in national
domestic structures and institutions. It is also important to note that in
terms of volume provision is also still overwhelmingly embedded in state
structures: public operators deliver 95% of networked water services.
Where access to water is limited, small-scale private independent
operators (ranging from individual water vendors to low-technology
neighbourhood systems) dominate. But large private corporations are
increasingly involved in water services delivery, including on a crossborder basis (Leclerc & Raes, 2001; Silva, Tynan, & Yilmaz, 1998). An
extraordinary 7,300% increase on 1974–1990 private sector investment in
water sanitation occurred between 1990 and 1997. This has since declined
to an absolute level of half the 1997 peak, totalling 11% of all water and
sanitation investments (Simpson, 2005:15). But the political salience of
the regulatory framework for commercial deliver of water services is
unlikely to be diluted. For even if the withdrawal of multinational
corporations from cross-border contracts turns out to be neither partial nor
temporary, it is unlikely to change the pressure coming from financial
institutions that lend money to large infrastructure projects to restructure
service provision along commercial lines.3

2

In a forthcoming publication (Morgan 2007), I argue that global water welfarism
operates in three dimensions: fiscal, administrative and legitimation, all embedded in a
tightly woven complex between Poverty Reduction Strategy Plans, Millenium
Development Goals and public-private partnership structures.
3
The most recent instantiations of these heated debates have moved beyond dichotomous
discussions of ‘public vs private’and focus on complex ranges of mixed public-private
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Developments that privilege private and transnational structures are even
more pronounced in relation to policymaking functions than they are in
relation to provision. Both intergovernmental (Dublin Statement, 1992;
European Commission, 2004; UN, 1978, 2000, 2005) and hybrid publicprivate fora have emerged as sites for debates over access to water and for
the formulation of influential position papers on key issues. The most
prominent hybrid forum is the tri-annual World Water Forum, hosted by
the World Water Council, which is legally a French-based NGO but in
practice a transnational organisation composed of a curious amalgam of
business-based NGOs and large corporations.4 Each World Water Forum
(the most recent was in Mexico in 2006) generates principles and policy
documents for guiding water governance, emphasizing such core issues as
‘full cost recovery’ in a heavily iterative fashion. Though not a UNsponsored event, each World Water Forum also hosts a formal
intergovernmental Ministerial Meeting. The UN has also created a
Millennium Task Force on Water and Sanitation that will identify the best
strategies for halving the number of people worldwide lacking access to
water.
The combination of developments in policymaking and provision is
creating the nascent outlines of a transnational institutional dimension to
urban water services delivery. This development is deeply politically
contested. Two broad models could be said to be competing: managed
liberalisation on the one hand, and on the other, a reinvigorated image of
public provision that stresses participatory democracy rather than
bureaucratic state involvement (Morgan 2006a). Importantly, both models
are influenced by a blend of local, national and transnational rules and
institutions, and both stress the importance of social objectives in the
context of the harsh distributional effects of globalising market forces. In
other words, there is no necessary link between managed liberalisation and
the increased involvement of transnational actors and institutions, nor
between participatory democracy and local or national actors. In either
structures for the delivery of water services: see in particular Water Operator Partnership
(WOP) initiatives.
4
Members include Suez, Severn Trent, Vivendi, Mitsubishi, Evian, Electricite de France,
Japan Dam Engineering Centre, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, PriceWaterhouse Coopers,
US Army Corps of Engineers.
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case, domestic regulatory institutions are a crucial part of the picture.
Regulation is a core aspect of the political contestation over the different
models, precisely because it is salient on both sides of the dichotomy of
‘water as a human right’ versus ‘water as a commodity’ (Morgan 2005).
Thus whether state or private provision is envisaged, regulation is crucial,
and it remains resolutely local or national. In the next section, I outline
two approaches to regulation that are linked to the competing models of
global water welfarism. Transactional regulation is coherent with the
managed liberalisation model and political regulation with the
participatory democracy model.

A. POLITICAL AND TRANSACTIONAL REGULATION: THE DYSTOPIC
SIDE OF ‘IDEAL TYPES’
The changes in the policy environment for urban water service delivery
alluded to above are often presented as part of a larger process of
embedding neoliberal policies in transnational settings (Goldman 2006;
Conca 2006). Recent discussions of the ‘neoliberal shift’ (Peck and Tickell
2002) emphasise that while earlier phases may have focused on ‘rolling
back’ the state, contemporary policy approaches are more inclined to
stress ‘rolling out’ the state, in variously creative ways. Regulating for
access to water is an example of this creative turn. Regulatory
frameworks, institutionalised at national or local levels rather than global,
are an increasingly important aspect of the overall structure, often but not
always centred around independent regulatory agencies. As will be
explored in detail in Part III, the specific empirical trajectories of
regulatory dynamics in different national sites vary considerably. To frame
this discussion, it is helpful to specify two ‘ideal type’ images of
regulation, while also appreciating their dystopic mirror images. These
two images are of a political conception of regulation on the one hand and
– perhaps more familiar – a transactional image on the other hand. It is
important not to assume that the two necessarily fall on opposite sides of
the political conflicts typical of access to water. Although the emphasis on
regulation which has emerged in global water policy has taken root in a
broadly neoliberal context, that context has significant non-market social
aspirations. These lead to an emphasis not only on the provision of stable
property rights for investors but also on complementary subsidy schemes
and extensive ‘stakeholder’ participation. Moreover, ‘political’ regulation
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may not necessarily benefit the poor through redistribution but may
instead cement the position of local elites.
A political conception of regulation draws from the French school of
‘regulationist theory’ which has neo-Marxist roots, but is also compatible
with a range of essentially Keynesian social welfare accounts of citizenstate relations (Klerck 1996). Here, different modes of regulation, one
mode of which may be law, are envisioned as tools for balancing and
ensuring a ‘relatively harmonious relationship’ between production,
consumption and exchange in the accumulation process. Regulation in this
view is importantly mediated by “historically and spatially specific
institutional forms and norms of behaviour” (Klerck 1996: 111), making
the contingencies of specific local contexts and the quality of social
relations between producers and consumers highly salient to any analysis.
In particular, the regulationist school pays specific attention to “the impact
of non-commodity forms of social relations which may assist in balancing
consumption and production cycles (Klerck 1996: 111).
Transactional regulation is perhaps more familiar, in content if not in
name. Embedded in Weberian notions of calculability, it involves the state
moving away from earlier welfare economics notions of pre-emptively
correcting market failures that might harm vulnerable consumers. The
state focuses instead on a more spartan role of facilitating transactional
frameworks. Inside these transactional frameworks, those who implement
delivery can and do address social issues, but within the purview of
managerial discretion rather than as the implementation of a formal, even
legal, obligation. The ‘transaction’ is the relationship between government
and private provider, not between vulnerable consumers and a provider
(public or private). Thus the quality of social relations between producers
and consumers is not a direct concern for politics or law in this approach,
but becomes part of market or commodity relations. Politics and law focus
on the attempt to produce what one commentator vividly called
‘bureaucrats with an entrepreneurial kick’!
The difference between political and transactional regulation is partly a
difference of ideology and substantive belief, focused on whether
allocating resources should be tied to price or to political power. It is also
a different approach to the quality of rules that structure the allocation of
resources. In transactional regulation, stability is paramount and thus these
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rules should be ‘time-consistent’; in political regulation, rules structuring
the allocation of resources are more fluid and responsive to the changing
social contexts of different consumer groups. It is fair to say that on the
whole, transnational actors such as multinational companies or
international financial institutions promote a transactional model while
national governments prefer a political model. But as we shall see in Part
Two, the full story is more complex, centring on different coalitions whose
members include both national and international actors.
In order to better frame the empirical complexity addressed in Part Two, it
is helpful to insist upon the dystopian potential of each ideal type. To
acknowledge that both political and transactional regulation can take
pathological forms is to recognise, in a somewhat stylised way, the plural
standpoints that necessarily characterise any collectivity. The following
pictorial representation, which is drawn from a World Bank paper on
regulation in Latin American water services (Foster 2005) shows, I would
argue, a dystopic version of political regulation that is ‘cured’ by an ‘ideal
type’ of transactional regulation. The ‘reformed’ model of regulation (an
ideal type transactional view in my argument) seeks to eliminate ‘dole
handouts and partisan loans’. The vision is one of purifying clientilism:
politicians become policymakers giving strategic guidance; the creation of
a regulatory agency replaces political favours with a focus on technical
decisions about quality and price, introduces competition, and improves
cost-recovery and labour efficiency; as a consequence, the unconnected
are drawn into the circle of connection.
Figure 3 ‘Clientilist’ model of water provision
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‘Reformed’ model of water provision

Source: Vivien Foster, ‘Ten Years of Water Service Reform in Latin America: Towards
an Anglo-French Model’ (2005:8)

The trouble is, of course, that one person’s ‘dole handouts and partisan
loans’ may be another person’s legitimate redistributive politics. Similarly,
one person’s view that price and quality regulation applies independent
expertise to issues formerly subject to arbitrary political discretion, may be
mirrored by others’ opinion that this technocracy simply masks an
inversely malign politics of regulatory capture. There are, in other words,
‘missing’ politics in the reformed model that could equally be
characterised either as features of political regulation’s ideal type, or as
dystopic features of transactional regulation:
Figure 5:
The missing politics in the ‘reformed’ model
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Part III will explore the ways in which these ‘missing politics’ shape the
regulatory dynamics that emerged in Chile, Argentina and Bolivia around
the delivery of water services. While they can be portrayed as indications
of a clash between incompatible models of global governance, more
interesting and challenging questions emerge from looking at regulatory
implementation in some detail. These questions raise the possibility that
transnational transformations of developing states vis-à-vis their approach
to water services delivery may catalyse an integration of constructive
conflict into regulatory relationships. This would involve integrating
professional expertise with modulated political input and feedback in such
a way that over time, a regulatory culture that blends politics and expertise
is institutionalised. Such a vision builds bridges between regulatory and
citizen space (Morgan 2006a), while still acknowledging the political
character of regulation (Dubash 2005; Minogue 2007). Ultimately I argue
that such bridges depend more crucially on local and national institutions,
particularly of dispute resolution, than on transnational ones, but that
productive reform can be catalysed by the transnational dimensions of
regulatory change over time.

III. COMPARATIVE REGULATORY DYNAMICS AND
THE REVERBERATIONS OF ‘MISSING POLITICS’
Part III explores the regulatory dynamics that emerged in relation to the
delivery of water services in urban contexts in three Latin American case
studies in Bolivia, Chile and Argentina in the late 1990s and early 2000s.5
All three countries also experienced extensive foreign investment from the
world’s largest water multinationals during the 1990s. Of the four largest
water services firms active in the transnational water services market,
5

The empirical work reported in this section is drawn from a larger project in which six
qualitative comparative case studies of (in most cases) specific disputes were carried out
in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, France, New Zealand and South Africa, as well as
interviews with international actors, and observations over two years of multi-stakeholder
fora and trade and investment negotiations. The project aimed to explore the relationship
between the local, national and transnational aspects of regulatory governance and grassroots advocacy in relation to urban water services policy. I am grateful to the UK
Economic and Social Research Council for funding the research under the title ‘The
Commodification of Water, Social Protest and Cosmopolitan Citizenship’: RES-143-250031.
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three are headquartered in France (Ondeo, Veolia and Saur) and one in the
UK (Thames Water). The two largest, Ondeo and Veolia may be more
commonly known as Suez and Vivendi.6 Suez, Vivendi and Thames all
invested significantly in Chile, Bolivia and Argentina during the 1990s.7
The fieldwork on which the research is based was structured around major
disputes involving transnational water companies, using Chile as a control
case since it lacked a single major dispute. All three countries established
regulatory agencies: Argentina at provincial level and Bolivia and Chile at
central government level. In Bolivia and Argentina, the disputes studied
ended with the transnational investor terminating the concession and
lodging a dispute in an international arbitration forum.
The three countries share a formal similarity in their common adoption of
semi-independent regulatory agencies in the water sector. However, this
adoption occurred under very different contextual conditions: Bolivia was
experiencing developments that led eventually to a social and political
revolution of sorts with the election of Evo Morales as president;
Argentina experienced a serious economic crisis in 2000; and Chile has
remained a stable, depoliticized, investment-friendly context during the
period studied. Their shared experience of transnational investment in
cross-border markets for the delivery of water services generated a
common pressure for transactional regulation, at least partially satisfied at
the formal level by the existence of agencies in each country. But the
detail of implementation indicates significant national variation in
outcome, as the bulk of this section will explore.
Before turning to the detailed case studies, it is worth noting that the
regulatory structures for water service provision in the UK and France, the
6

The two largest by some margin are Ondeo (previously Suez and before that Lyonnaise
des Eaux) which serves 110 million people in more than 100 countries, and Veolia
(previously Vivendi Environnement and before that Compagnie Generale des Eaux)
which serves 96.5 million people in 90 countries: see Gleick et al., The New Economy of
Water (2002) at 24-25. Thames Water serves 22 million people: see D.Yaron, The Final
Frontier (2000).
7
Suez bought the regional water company providing water to Santiago, Chile and secured
longterm concessions in Buenos Aires, Santa Fe and Cordoba, Argentina and La Paz,
Bolivia. Thames bought initially one and eventually three regional water companies in
the south of Chile. Vivendi had a stake in the Buenos Aires concession and also secured a
longterm concession in the province of Tucuman, Argentina. The companies have now
disinvested in all but
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home states of investor companies, usefully illustrate the contingency of
transactional and political models of regulation. The UK has arguably
established one of the clearest instances of transactional regulation in
water services anywhere in the world, with its fully privatised water
industry regulated by an independent, highly technocratic regulatory
agency Ofwat. France, by marked contrast, has self-consciously chosen
not to establish such an agency, rejecting this option in a high-profile
legislative debate as recently as 1999.8 Rather, France has achieved public
service goals in water service delivery not by state provision9 but by
political regulation,10 focused initially on substantive but increasingly on
procedural aspects of long-term contracting-out for private sector
provision.
Such variation in the home investor country approaches is replicated even
within countries. For while France has preserved political regulation
internally for the provision of water services, its companies seek
transactional regulation externally for the governance of their transnational
investments. During the 1990s the transnational investment portfolios of
French water companies increased significantly. Over the same period,
France has been actively involved in trying to secure progress in
transnational regulatory structures for water services. French companies
and organisations were founding members of a voluntary self-regulatory
regime through the International Standards Organisation (Morgan 2006c),
and have lobbied vigorously to include water services in the GATS
treaties. French companies also chose Latin America as their primary
8

See the 1999 report of the High Council on Public Services, Quelle régulation pour l'eau
et les services publics FRANCE. Haut conseil du secteur public, Paris 1999.
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/004000299/ext.shtml.
The
proposal was highly politically sensitive and was abandoned in favour of a toothless
‘water observatory’ with little funding or powers: interview with M. Sironneau and M.
Riveau, Department of the Environment, September 2004.
9
Interestingly, even though France is often seen as the exemplar of the European ‘social
model’ with more enthusiasm than most for an etatist vision of ‘le service public’, in the
specific domain of water services the role of the French state has been regulatory since
the late 19th century
10
Until 1982, this centred on model contracts for leases and concessions whose terms
were centrally controlled, especially in relation to prices. The decentralisation reforms of
the 1980s in France led to a period of fairly unregulated contractual amendments, but the
1990s saw a return of political regulation, focused now on procedural issues such as
transparency of tendering.
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destination for pursuing longterm water concessions in the 1990s, a setting
where more than perhaps anywhere else in the developing world, the
spread of independent regulatory agencies had taken root (Jordana and
Levi-Faur 2005). Finally, French water companies have extensively used
the dispute resolution facilities provided by venues such as the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in
the World Bank (Morgan 2006c). It is the combination of the two
strategies (political regulation at home and transactional regulation
abroad) that coalesces in the vision of ‘managed liberalisation’ mentioned
earlier as one of the competing models in global water governance.
As we shall see in the rest of Part III , a competing model is emerging
from the regulatory dynamics in host states of transnational investment, an
important counter to assumptions too often made that globalisation
involves the subjection of developing countries to ‘external’ pressures to
which they ‘respond’. The most important source of this competing model,
based on participatory visions of democracy, are the events that unfolded
in Bolivia.

A. WATER AND REGULATION IN BOLIVIA
Although Suez had a major contract in Bolivia’s capital, La Paz, the
detailed dispute that was the subject of field research in the larger project
underpinning this article was an earlier concession in Cochabamba held by
a joint venture between Bechtel and International Water. The Cochabamba
dispute has become an iconic reference point (in either positive or negative
terms depending on one’s perspective) in international regulatory and
political dynamics around struggles over access to water. At the same
time, the presence of ‘repeat players’ such as Suez in La Paz importantly
shaped the Bolivian government’s response to conflict over water service
delivery in Cochabamba.
In 1997, Bolivia decided to involve the international private sector in
water provision in Cochabamba, in part motivated by a very ambitious
vision of water resource development for this normally very arid region,
involving not only the operation of urban water services but also the
construction of a major dam (the Miscuni Dam). Although there was
certainly pressure from the Inter-American Development Bank to contract
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out this work to the private sector, there was also an undoubted enthusiasm
on the part of local political elites for securing the financial backing of a
large multinational for this project. As a result of this local-international
coalition, the key political dynamics likely to disrupt the process were
those at municipal level. This fitted badly with the timing and placement
of the relevant regulatory agency. Bolivia had established a detailed
legislative structure for utilities as a whole (gas, electricity,
telecommunications and water) in 1994, with a ‘super-regulator’
(SIRESE) overseeing a range of sectoral regulators.11 This operated at
central government level with little consultation with municipal
governments. The government originally planned to establish separate
regulators for water resources and for water services but the former ran
into sufficient political opposition that by 1997, only detailed regulations
for bringing into being a regulatory agency for water services had
emerged.
More problematically, the framework of legal duties for the water services
regulator, the Superintendent of Basic Sanitation (SISAB), was
substantially amended just one month after Cochabamba’s water services
were concessioned to Bechtel in September 1999. The 1999 Ley de
Servicios de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado Sanitario (Law 2029), despite
its title focusing on the provision of water and waste services, in fact
empowered SISAB to regulate water resources more generally
(agricultural, irrigation, industrial, mining, etc.) at least until a specific
body was created for this purpose.12 This gave SISAB highly controversial
powers at the precise moment when its regulatory task expanded
enormously with the entry of the international private sector into the
Bolivian water services market.
An overall evaluation of SISAB’s role in the Bolivian case study suggests
that despite it possessing some formal technical capacity, it was politically
marginalised. It was structured to emulate an idea of transactional
11

1994 Ley No. 1600, October 28, 1994 framework of all regulators (Sistema de
Regulacion Sectorial - SIRESE).
12
Specifically, the very last provision of law 2029 (dubbed a transitory article) says that
the concessions and authorizations for the usage of hydrological resources as well as their
revocation will be granted by a regulator to be created under the Framework Regulatory
System of Renewable Natural Resources (SIRENARE). It adds, however, that this
regulator is created such functions will be performed by SISAB.
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regulation but embedded in a broader context that supported political
regulation at best, and from some quarters a far more populist and
participatory politically driven vision of local development. It was located
at central government level although water services had been delivered by
public municipal-level entities. Although it was relatively independent
from immediate political influence of any crude kind, and its employees
did possess basic technical expertise, it had an inadequate legal structure
and only 31 staff. Its birth and culture was also heavily shaped by
international expertise and support, and continues to be heavily dependent
on this for operating at all: international financial institutions staffed the
initial unit that drafted the SIRESE framework and continues to support
SISAB extensively with consultancies or even basic staff support.13 The
InterAmerican Development Bank in 2002 actually become a member of
ANESAPA, the Bolivian professional association of water companies,
illustrating the deep interpenetration of the national and international
sector in the Bolivian context.14
SISAB’s regulatory role in supervising international contracts took place
in the shadow of Bolivia’s commitment to systems of international
arbitration for dispute resolution through various bilateral investment
treaties (BITs). Here in particular, the influence of international politics
has been very powerful. For example, shortly after signing the concession,
Bechtel relocated its corporate headquarters to the Netherlands, making it
possible for Bechtel to take advantage of the protection afforded by the
BIT between the Netherlands and Bolivia (there was no equivalent USBolivia BIT). Evidence from Argentina discussed below suggests that
ICSIT-based dispute resolution undermines a political response to
regulatory conflict, and may shore up a transactional response. However,
in Bolivia, SISAB’s position was not shored up, raising the question of
why the regulator was so politically marginalized despite its technical
capacity and strong international support?

13

Interview with Silvia Arzabe, Planning Support Officer for SISAB, September 2004.
Semapa: a un ano de la institucionalizacion, Semapa annual report 2002-3. ANESAPA
began as a public sector trade organization in 1982, expanded to allow private and
cooperative companies as members in 1997, and in 2002, expanded to include “national
and international institutions, NGOs or natural persons with legal relations with the water
sector”: p.67.

14
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The answer lies in the restricted ambit of what social groups perceived as
SISAB’s legitimate jurisdiction. The key focus of broad regulatory
dynamics in the Bolivian case was the legislative framework for water
resources broadly speaking: provisions affecting irrigation, mining and so
on. This was far broader than the infrastructural issues which the SISAB
regulatory framework focused on, and even though the government
formally gave broader duties to SISAB in the 1999 amendments, the lack
of perceived legitimacy for this action stymied progress in the key action
sites. These were popular politics and mass mobilization, together with
legislative negotiations to create a new framework for governing water
resources more generally. SISAB had little chance of emerging as an
important player in this context, appearing as an agency bravely trying to
join a field of professional expertise with which few of the politically
salient local players were familiar, and manipulating the technical
minutiae of a regulatory politics which did not resonate or have any
history of engagement with local political dynamics.
Two examples suffice to illustrate this tension. The first occurred during
the dispute: in December 1999, SISAB held a public hearing on tariffs.
They required those who attended to register and to bring identification
and consequently only 14 people pre-registered. In the event, it was
suspended when SISAB realized it was likely to catalyse a large social
mobilization: the latter was much more salient in shaping the policy
trajectory on tariffs than SISAB’s attempts at transparency. The second
example comes from the period after the Cochabamba municipal water
company was remunicipalised: since around 2002, SISAB has valiantly
tried (with World Bank funding) to install a consumer education
programme, focused on training neighbourhood board leaders, social
groups, guilds, mothers associations, and church groups in matters of
‘regulation, rights, obligations, complaints, and water care’. However, at
the same time as this was occurring, the groups most capable of derailing
the larger policy agenda were involved in extensive deliberative,
participatory drafting of the new water resources legislative framework,15
15

This evolved from a civil society-based organization, Comité de Gestión Integral del
Agua en Bolivia (CGIAB) in 1998, to an Interinstitutional Water Council (CONIAG)
collaboratively which had representatives from agriculture, sustainable development,
economics, housing and basic services from the government, as well as 5 civil society
representatives from peasants, irrigators, indigenous people, private sector and academia.
By 2004 CONIAG had drafted and passed Law 2878 for the support of irrigators.
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and in instantiating ‘social control’ of the municipal company (Terhorst
2003). In their view this extensive consumer outreach programme only
reached issues at the margins of what mattered most to people, at a point
in time that was too late for them to shape the more structural decisions
that would determine the allocation of resources and power.16 Comanagement, not consultation, was the politically salient issue, and was
sidestepped by the design of SISAB’s consumer awareness programme.
In short, the regulatory agency was focused on a technocratic approach to
the ‘minor water cycle’ while the most politically salient players placed
the ‘major water cycle’ at the centre of a highly politicized and expressive
politics of struggle. The implicit social imaginary driving the politics of
the Bolivian case – a vision of politically driven, locally rooted, holistic
development – had little synergy with the independent regulatory agency
modelled on the ‘best practice’ recommendations of international financial
institutions. Instead, this social imaginary was at the root of a
reinvigorated vision of participatory public management: a vision that
aspires to replace the managed liberalization of global water welfarism.
This has to some extent taken place in water. For example, after the
election of Evo Morales, whose success was deeply rooted in struggles
over access to natural resources, the international arbitration action arising
from the Cochabamba dispute was eventually settled for the symbolic sum
of 2 Bolivian pesos. And more recently, Bolivia very publicly withdrew
from the International Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID). We shall see in the Argentinian case study a different
kind of compromise which favours the transactional regulation model to a
greater degree. But what is emerging in Bolivia is not purely nationalist,
but is embedded in moves on the international stage since Evo Morales
became President,17 some in alliance with Cuba and Venezuela,18 that are
arguably coalescing into a broader agenda that some call a Bolivarian
Revolution’ (Gott and Bartoli 2005). This illustrates that the ‘politics of
necessity’ have their sources as much in the developing world as in the

16

Crespo Carlos Crespo Flores, Oxford Brookes University, “Superintendencias: Nuevos
Superpoderes (Democracia y Regulación en Bolivia)”, paper on file with author.
17
Eg the withdrawal from the ISCID Convention, the appointment of one of the major El
Alto water activists in La Paz to the post of Water Minister.
18
Eg the dissenting Ministerial Declaration at the 4th World Water Forum in Mexico in
2006, drafted by Bolivia and endorsed by Cuba and Venezuela.
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industrialised world, even when the relations between them are as sharply
polarised as the Bolivian case study indicates.

B. WATER AND REGULATION IN CHILE
Chile’s regulatory institutions represent something much closer to the
‘ideal’ transactional vision supported by international financial institutions
and a strong epistemic community. A number of features make Chile’s
politics of water privatization unique. First, access to water in Chile is far
more widespread than other developing countries. In 1930, the Chilean
central government made the provision of water and sewage services
(WSS) a developmental priority, and unusually high coverage has
subsisted especially since the 1970s.19 Secondly, the provision of water
services is unusually centralised – even a restructuring along regional lines
in the 1970s followed technocratic lines, creating 12 centrally controlled
regional public companies rather than decentralising any authority to more
local political levels of government. In the 1980s, the decentralization
sweeping the rest of Latin America was rejected in Chile, influenced by
the ‘Chicago boys’: economic technocrats holding powerful positions in
government, many of whom were educated at the University of Chicago
economics department. They argued that there was insufficient
professional capacity at local government levels, and that the private
sector would provide more reliable expertise as well as efficiency gains.
Thirdly, Chile is unusually urban – only 10% of the population lives in
rural areas. And finally, there is a relatively low level of civil society
activism, particularly around issues of socio-economic policy.20
Thus rather than an urgent need for investment for basic access to water,
the catalyst for the entry of the international private sector into Chile’s
WSS sector was two-fold in the 1980s: ideological neo-liberalism, and the
need to raise private finance to build waste treatment plants. Some argue
19

Coverage is 99.7% and 24 hours a day and sewage is 94%: Alexander Chechilnitzky,
“AIDIS: 55 anos de fructifera labor”, La Revista de Aidis-Chile, September 2003.
20
The causes of this are not clear – many interviewees attributed it to Chilean culture, but
the lingering effects of Pinochet’s dictatorship may be just as material: see Houtzager and
Kurtz 2000 for an argument about the lingering effects of institutional and structural
changes introduced by Pinochet on rural grass-roots mobilization. See also Foweraker
2001.
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that the US-Chile free trade agreement created legal pressures to meet
international standards in wastewater treatment in order to facilitate fruit
exports – but it is not entirely clear if this was a post hoc justification for
an otherwise ideological decision to involve the private sector. It does
appear, however, that economic export-oriented goals were an important
part of the motivation, and the percentage of wastewater that is now
treated has almost doubled between 1998 and 2005.21
Chile’s water services have undergone three main reforms in the structure
of provision: corporatisation 1989-1998 (associated with efficiency gains),
a brief period of privatisation 1998-2001 (associated with raising capital to
build waste treatment plants) and concessioning 2001-present (associated
with a political backlash against privatization). The public water
companies were restructured along ‘corporatised’ lines in 1989 just before
democracy returned to Chile,22 and Aylwin’s centre-left government left
this in place. Almost a decade later, after a stormy debate in 1998 under
the centre-left government of Eduardo Frei, legislation to allow
privatization was passed, albeit with a ceiling on ownership.23 This ceiling
was quietly removed a few months later in a little-noticed tax bill.24
Between 1998 and 2000, five of the 13 regional companies were
privatised.25 The remaining eight were offered out to long-term
concessions rather than outright privatisation.26 Few seem to think that the
difference between outright asset sales and long-term concession has any
powerful political or even practical implications. Indeed, despite the shift
away from privatisation towards the concession system, another littlenoticed tax bill in 2003 allowed four of the five companies originally
21

Treated wastewater levels were 42% in 2003 but were on target to reach 81% by the
end of 2005: Alexander Chechilnitzky, “AIDIS: 55 anos de fructifera labor”, La Revista
de Aidis-Chile, September 2003.
22
The state industry development arm CORFO was relieved of service delivery
obligations in water. 13 regional joint-stock companies were created: Ley 18.777 of 17
January 1989
23
General Law for Sanitation Services (Law 19,549, 1995 bill) of February 5 1998.
24
Article 5 of Ley 19,888 of 14 July 1998 (a general tax law) abolished any ceiling on the
sale of shares in water companies.
25
Emos (Santiago - Suez), Esval (Valparaiso, Region V - Anglian), Essbio (Concepion,
Region VIII - Thames), Essel (Region VI - Thames) and Essal (Region VIII – Iberdrola).
26
An internal review by the then President Richard Lagos in the late 1990s, then Minister
of Public Works (and later to be President in 2001) underpinned this policy shift.
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privatised in the late 1990s to be sold entirely.27 This narrative
encapsulates Chilean regulatory dynamics in the water sector: an odd mix
of polarised public political debate that fails to alter the direction of the
policy trajectory, together with major decisions made in the interstices of
technical and obscure legislation.
Water services in Chile are regulated by SISS (the Superintendency of
Sanitation Services).28 SISS is a regulatory agency that replaced a
government department in 1990 when corporatisation took place.
Consistent with transactional models of regulation, the key relationships
were those between the regulator and the regional companies, rather than
those with consumers. During the 1990s, these relationships (between
SISS and the regional companies) were ones of negotiation and fairly
cordial bargaining. The shift to privatisation in 1998 inaugurated a more
adversarial relationship between operators and regulator. In the wake of
the rapid privatisation of 5 of the 13 companies, between 2000 and 2001
fines imposed by SISS increased by 69%.29. An analysis of SISS data on
adjudicatory decisions by the regulator together with judicial appeals
(1995-2005: see Figure 1) shows that the privatised companies dominate
the statistics of above-average fines levied, the highest rates of large fines,
and the highest appeal rates against fines.30 The actions were also almost
without exception initiated by the regulator or the company rather than
consumers, and focused mainly on defining the limits of property rights as
between regulator and operator – i.e. typical of transactional regulatory
politics. Moreover, although SISS usually prevailed upon appeal, and
although at least some of these instances should have indirectly benefited

27

A bill to "establish the funding needed to ensure the priority social objectives of the
government":Ley 19888 of August 2003, Article 5. Emos, the Santiago company and the
most politically sensitive, was not included.
28
Chile's water resources are regulated by the general water department (DGA), a unit of
the Ministry of Public Works which oversees a complex system of tradeable water rights
established in 1981 (a system beyond the scope of this research).
29
Morrison Foerseter, Quarterly Report on Water Industry Developments in Latin America –
March 2002. 2001 fines were 33 in number totalling US$1.07 million
30
One interesting exception to the general pattern is Essbio, the Thames-owned company
which attracted the highest fines but did not feature in the high appeal statistics. This can
be explained by the fact that Essbio attracted more political controversy than any other
water company in Chile and may have considered the political costs of appealing greater
than the likelihood of success.
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consumers, the Chilean water sector lacks any legal device for
indemnifying consumers.
Figure 4: Analysis of cases brought to Chilean water regulator SISS
1995-2005

Company
Aguas Andinas
Essar
Esmag
Essan
Essel
Essam
Essat
Essbio
Essco
Emmssa
Essal
Emssat
Emos
Esval
Total

Average fine
Above average
fines
Average appeal
rate
Those with
highest appeal
rates
Highest rate of
big fines
Highest fines per
se
Big fines as % of
total fines

No of fines
3
5
2
3
23
10
12
23
7
3
13
6
21
13

% of total
2%
3%
1%
2%
16%
7%
8%
16%
5%
2%
9%
4%
15%
9%

Appealed or not
3
0
0
0
2
1
2
5
2
1
6
3
11
8

%
appealed
100%
0%
0%
0%
9%
10%
17%
22%
29%
33%
46%
50%
52%
62%

Fines
= or >
300
UTM
0
0
0
0
10
1
2
8
2
0
3
0
3
5

144

100%

31%

33.10%

23.61%

202.92

Essbio, Esval, Essat, Essam, Essel, Emmssa
31%

(descending order)
(descending order)

Esval, Emos, Essal

(descending order,
all above 1000 UTM)

Essbio, Essel, Esval, Essal, Essat, Emos, Essam

(descending order)

Essbio, Esval, Essam, Essat
Essbio+Esval+Essam+Essat=10968/total fines 36487=30.06%

Source: compiled from analysis of SISS records

Average
fine
200
9
55.5
85.67
243.43
259.8
260.33
488.91
137.14
48.67
217.15
48.33
137.14
446.85
202.92
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Regulatory politics in Chilean water services are characteristic of broader
macro-characteristics of Chile’s economy, which is heavily structured
along market lines yet markedly unfriendly to consumers:31 a kind of
openly clientilistic version of neoliberal reforms. Chilean water regulation
exemplifies a specific ideal of transactional regulation in that the
regulatory agency was established 9 years before full privatisation as a
way of disciplining the (then) newly corporatised water company
companies. The key issues that attract regulatory energy are tariff-setting,
accounting processes for investment obligations, procurement processes,
and mergers. Social issues are kept firmly separate from the regulatory
agency, mainly consisting of a complex subsidy scheme administered by
the municipalities.
A brief description of how tariffs are set is an emblematic instance of the
texture of Chilean regulatory politics in water. The tariff system is based
on hypothetical models of a perfectly efficient company, rather than on
trying to cost in actually existing inefficiencies. Both the regulator and the
company produce estimates based on their own models, using complex
formulae that are laid down by the legislative framework, and public terms
of reference for the models. 15 days of negotiation follow the production
of estimates, and if no consensus can be reached, an expert panel of 3
makes the final decision.32
Interestingly, international arbitration is not a powerful feature of the
regulatory space in Chilean water politics. One interpretation of this is that
international investors respect the combination of the formal independence
and substantive expertise of the regulator as sufficient to provide the
political stability they need and seek. But an equally plausible reason for
this comfort could be the political support enjoyed by international
investors. The international private sector directly provides a majority of
Chile’s citizens with water services. The policy environment is sensitive to
31

In 2005 the World Economic Forum gave Chile first place for macroeconomic
handling in a global survey, but only 53rd place for consumer responsiveness: Eduardo
Engel, ‘Consumidores: tres tareas pendientes’, La Tercera, 20 noviembre 2005.
32
One member is nominated by the relevant company, one by the regulator SISS and the
third agreed upon by both. Often the third member (typically a PhD qualified economist)
effectively decides the issue. The expert panel decisions have never been judicially
reviewed, though heated technical debates regarding the parameters of the models have
persisted and been clarified over time by legislative revision.
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perceptions of ‘investment climate’ held by these investors, and this
undoubtedly shapes the regulatory dynamics.33 Moreover, the separation
between economic and social issues mentioned above in the domestic
context is mirrored in relation to transnational links. While dispute
settlement does not strongly shape the Chilean regulatory environment in
the water sector, Chile has extensive links to regional and global
associations that set standards, such as AIDIS (InterAmerican Association
of Engineers). Santiago also hosts the Latin American branches of both the
UN Economic and Social Commission and of Consumers International,
embedding it in international networks of actors who develop the social
and consumer dimensions of water policy.
Overall, the day-to-day regulatory dynamics are dominated by a legalised
power struggle between major interests, irritated at the margins by partypolitical dynamics which are often limited in their effectiveness due to the
strong centralisation of executive power in Chilean constitutional
structure. This creates less of a powerful basis for constructive conflict in
regulatory politics in Chile than might initially seem to be the case.
Routinised technocracy coexists with, but is relatively unresponsive to, a
politicised debate portrayed in black-and-white terms. In this, there is little
or no integration of professional expertise with modulated political input
and feedback, and thus only very weak institutionalization of a regulatory
culture that blends politics and expertise.
Arguably, an important ‘missing link’ is the absence of space for the
routinised incorporation of ‘everyday citizen’ demands. In Bolivia, these
were expressed through mass mobilisation and direct action. At best what
exists in Chile is a highly individualised form of action within consumer
law. In Argentina, as we shall see, lower levels of direct action coexist
with administrative law-type procedures for vindicating the public interest.
But in Chile there is a marked absence of such devices.34 Even though
33

Some interviewees made off-the-record comments regarding the subtle but powerful
(investor-friendly) influence of the Ministry of Economics over SISS.
34
In 2004, consumer protection legislation was finally amended after a 6 year battle, to
include a mild form of class action and some incentives to encourage collective consumer
associations. However even this reform (which itself is much criticised: Eduardo Engel,
‘Consumidores: tres tareas pendientes’, La Tercera, 20 noviembre 2005, noting that only
3 collective actions were lodged in the first year since the law was passed) does not
include public services within its remit.
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interviewees evoke an implicit social imaginary of a legalistic conception
of the public interest underpinning regulatory dynamics, there is little
institutional support for actually making this a reality. The legal device of
recurso de proteccion (effectively the ability to obtain an injunction) does
not facilitate collective consumer action: it is used mainly by the
companies against the regulator (not least because it must be filed within
15 days of any harm occurring). In addition, it creates no stare decisis and
relies on a dogmatic, slow and untransparent judicial process. There are no
administrative courts where abusive and illegal action can be challenged
by individuals. The most powerful oversight institution is the Controloria
which is an auditor, and ensures the legality of executive decrees. The
Controloria has facilitated an obsessive focus upon legality and
administrative probity but in business-friendly ways rather than collective
public interest. In short, the space for articulating claims of fairness,
equity, or human rights is severely constricted.
Of course, there are still ‘missing politics’ that drive the regulatory
dynamics away from the transactional model. It is not that lay-offs, tariff
rises, or undue contractor influence do not exist in Chile. Rather, they
seem not to spark the same kind of political mobilisation as they do in, for
example, Argentina. One interviewee from the Central Labour Union in
Chile said – with some regret – that ‘in Argentina, when the lights go off,
the people burn tires on the roadways and build barricades, while in Chile
they simply go down to the supermarket and buy candles’.35 Direct action
is remarkably muted, and public media coverage of water provision issues
focuses overwhelmingly on making the country safe for foreign investors.
There is certainly contestation. Some comes from individual legislators
who take up the cause of constituency members.36 Citizen groups have
also mobilised from time to time, albeit weakly. But the tight connections
between local elites and the mainstream transactional consensus on water
service provision means that managed liberalisation and transactional
regulation dominate the Chilean case.

35

Interview, Miguel Soto, Central Workers’ Union, January 2004.
See motions filed by Chilean House of Representatives member Patricio Walker, of the
Christian Democratic (DC), deputy Antonella Sciaraffia and senate candidate Fernando
Flores: La Estrella de Iquique, reported. In Morrison and Foerster quarterly update.

36
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C. WATER AND REGULATION IN ARGENTINA
In the early 1990s, President Menem’s sweeping neoliberal reforms to the
Argentine economy set the stage for the entry of the international private
sector into the water services sector. At the provincial level, these reforms
were enacted more as a result of pressure from the federal government
than from any locally relevant political dynamics, and this haunted the
regulatory dynamics from the start. In Tucumán province, the troubled
provincial state water company DIPOS had been governed by 15 different
Directors between 1981 (when it was first transferred to provincial control
from the federal government) and 1996. In March 1994, soon after the
Tucumán government passed a legislative framework for privatization in
March 1994 and by May 1995 had awarded a 30 year concession contract
to Vivendi.37 At the same time, there were attempts to transform DIPOS
into a regulator entitled ERSACT (Ente Regulador del Servicio de Agua y
Cloadas de Tucuman). These began in late 1994 and were formalised by
November 1995, in the process downsizing the 1,800 employees of
DIPOS to 900. The transformation was formal and superficial, arguably
one in name only, as employees were given little additional training or
preparation for this entirely new role of regulating rather than operating.38
In this messy fashion, DIPOS became ERSACT, now ostensibly an
independent regulator with the job of monitoring concessionaire providers
of water. ERSACT suffered from being a provincial regulator established
more or less through central fiat, as well as having no time to embed its
new role before the international private sector began operating in the
province. The outcome was that the regulator lacked substantial expertise,
and played a populist role in the regulatory dynamics – one that was at
times politically salient, though certainly not in the ideal-typical image of
transactional regulation. The most interesting moment of ERSACT’s
political salience was when a leveraged coordination with the ombudsman
37

Formally speaking the contract was with Vivendi’s Argentine affiliate Aguas del
Aconquija. The parent company was known as Compagnie Générale des Eaux (CGE) at
the time of entering into the concession and more recently as Veolia, though still more
popularly recognized as Vivendi, which will be the name used here. Although Aguas del
Aconquija has a separate legal personality, it is controlled in substance by Vivendi.
38
Interview with Daniel Arancibia, former President of ERSACT and Director of DIPOS,
June 2004.
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occurred, as will be narrated below. While there were definite limits to the
constructive nature of these regulatory politics, the episode certainly
illustrates an interesting interaction of international, national and local
pressures within one regulatory space, one which shows both the necessity
of taking into account consumer group perspectives, and the significant
limits on state responsiveness created by transnational pressures.
The concession contract contained detailed provisions about the service
that Vivendi would provide, the tariffs it would charge, and the
investments it would make. After the agreement was entered into, disputes
arose between Vivendi and Tucumán over various issues including the
method for measuring water consumption, the level of tariffs to customers,
the timing and percentage of any increase in tariffs, the remedy for nonpayment of tariffs, Vivendi’s right to pass-through to customers certain
taxes, and the quality of the water delivered. The disputes took multiple
forms at the domestic level but led ultimately to an arbitration claim
lodged by Vivendi in the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID).39
The possibility of international arbitration under ICSID shaped the larger
political context. The federal government undertook a diplomatic mission
to resolve the dispute informally, sending former President Menem of
Argentina to France to negotiate there, pressuring provincial officials in
Tucumán both publicly in the press and privately,40 and helping prepare a
new agreement between Vivendi and Tucumán Province with a Working
Group of the Provincial Attorney-General, a union representative and the
CEO of Vivendi.41 This created significant pressure on the local dispute
resolution dynamics, however subtly. A key focus of the broader
regulatory dynamics was legislation that the legislature was trying to pass
that would have mandated ‘social tariffs’ in an attempt to temper the
39

Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. & Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. Argentine
Republic, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3 (12 November 2000), 40 ILM 426, also
available
(with
subseqent
decisions
on
the
same
case)
at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm#award15. The case was originally
filed on February 19 1997, relying on a 1991 BIT between Argentina and France.
40
The Minister of Economy at the time, Fernandez, even threatened a federal-provincial
lawsuit for the damage caused to Argentina’s image in the eyes of foreign investors.
41
Interview with Maria Pedicone de Valls, Provincial Attorney-General of Tucuman,
August 2004.
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effects of tariff rises under the concession. A mix of party political moves,
popular action on the streets, and small claims lawsuits kept pushing
forward this focus. But ultimately it clashed with the transnational
dimensions, as illustrated by the following story of the effect of an uneven
background distribution of power.
In the summer of 1996, many thousands of users ceased paying their water
bills in the wake of brown water and rising costs. The Tucumán
Ombudsman advised consumers who did this to lodge an administrative
dispute with the company alleging deficient rendering of services in
respect of water quality and incorrectly calculated tariffs.42 Non-response
to this dispute letter within 15 days bounced the dispute to the regulator,
ERSACT, who issued two resolutions discounting consumers bills’ in two
respects.43 Although only about 10% of payment boycotters filed the
appropriate paperwork, this still amounted to some thousands of people.
Vivendi did not challenge the decrees of the Ombudsman and regulator in
local courts but continued to voice its disagreement even while invoicing
customers in accordance with the decrees, and then immediately filing suit
against the boycotters to recover the unpaid charges once they had
rescinded the contract. Before the ICSID claim was filed, however, they
preferred to continue with political negotiations.
The Ombudsman took two unprecedented steps in response to Vivendi’s
lawsuits against the boycotters, basing its strategy on the fact that the
company was no longer the water provider by then. First, the Office tried
to lodge a collective action lawsuit in the courts on behalf of the
boycotters, but this was rejected in multiple consecutive fora by a series of
different judges. Secondly, it offered individual legal assistance to
consumers, having failed to secure such assistance from the local bar
association.44 Now it is difficult to substantiate directly the shadow of the
international power dynamics, not least because of the delicate political
42

This advice was supported by a series of resolutions issued by the Ombudsman’s
Office (n° 66 and n° 67 of 1996) that highlight the details of why the invoicing was
incorrect, drawing also on a public auditors’ report to the same effect (Tucuman Audit
Office Report 015, on file with author).
43
Resolution n° 212 and n° 213, discounting the bills first, by the amount of disputed
taxes that Vivendi was passing through on the bill, and secondly by the amount paid for
water during the periods that turbid, chocolate-coloured water was provided.
44
Interview with Bossio, Ombudsman, August 2004..
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nature of the conflict.45 But a somewhat extraordinary sequence of judicial
evasions in response to the Ombudsman’s claim resulted: in essence, ‘they
passed the ball from one to the other and nobody wanted to receive us’.46
The local bar association was similarly reluctant to become involved, and
there were vociferous – albeit disputed47 – claims that the World Bank
inserted a condition around that time on a large health and education loan
that required conflicts with public service concessions to be eliminated or
resolved. ERSACT was marginalised by the provincial government who
intervened in a receiver-like process, appointing an alternative auditor to
oversee the concession on the grounds that the company felt persecuted by
ERSACT.48 Overall, there was a distinct sense that World Bank and
ICSID processes constrained the domestic substantive and procedural
possibilities, even if the precise mechanisms of intervention were disputed
or indirect.
In terms of outcomes the legacy of this intersection of national and
international developments was ambiguous. The Tucuman water services
have been renationalised since 2004. Although the state company has
struggled to improve water services, the forms of civil society involvement
that were catalysed initially by private sector involvement have persisted
into the renewed era of public service operation. Civil society continued to
promote, after renationalisation, many legislative proposals, particularly
relating to tariff structures, disconnection and the recovery of unpaid bills,
45

This sensitivity is illustrated by the fact that a lawsuit filed by the Provincial AttorneyGeneral against Vivendi for breach of contract was later withdrawn when a change of
government occurred and has never been re-filed, despite the promises of three
consecutive Attorney-Generals to do so (Interviews with Ombudsman Bossio; Maria
Pedicone de Valls Provincial Attorney-General; Jose Domieu and Jorge Abdala, both
representing consumers’ associations, August 2004).
46
Interview with Maria Pedicone de Valls, Provincial Attorney-General of Tucuman,
August 2004. The courts were willing to hear many individual claims against non-payers
and issued sentences in relation to them, but the legislature intervened and passed a law
suspending the enforcement of these sentences for six months. This law became another
aspect of Vivendi’s claim in the ICSID process
47
Interviewees gave conflicting reports but a 13 August 1998 report in the local
newspaper La Gaceta quoted Governor Bussi as saying that US$55 million from the
World Bank could not be disbursed until the federal government had taken over the
concession, allowing Vivendi to leave.
48
Interview with Daniel Arancibia, former President of ERSACT and Director of DIPOS,
June 2004.
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both before and after the return of water services into public hands. In the
short term, effects on participation opportunities were disappointing. No
right to public hearings was obtained (although a precedent for this existed
in electricity), and a promised consumer representative on ERSACT’s
Board of Directors never came to fruition.
But substantive gains were made, including legislative prohibition of
water cut-offs to those using less than the basic minimum, and a ‘dispute
letter’ which boycotting consumers successfully used to stave off legal
action by Vivendi for non-payment, even after the Ombudsman’s legal
action stalled.49 And it is possible to argue that procedurally a kind of
‘popcorn’ incrementalism resulted: cumulatively, the unintended effects
did open up more space for responding to consumer concerns. In
particular, after a series of consumer group mobilisations in relation to
different water services contracts across Argentina, several involving
coalitions with international NGOs, a procedural victory of considerable
significance has emerged: the acceptance by ICSID tribunals of amicus
curiae briefs from civil society organizations, even in the face of
objections from parties.50 Interestingly, what we see in these two kinds of
gains is an uneasy truce between political regulation at the local level, and
a more transactional model at the interface with transnational actors in
arbitration fora. For even though the ICSID process amendment is a
victory for participation, it is a form of participation that still sidesteps
democractically elected governments, and does nothing to expand their
policy space. Taken in conjunction with the recent award of US$105
million by ICSID to Vivendi for compensation in the dispute, the
opportunity to lodge a brief in ICSID hearings is at risk of being a
marginal amendment to the overriding dominance of transactional
regulation and the liberalised management model of global water
welfarism.

49

Interview with Jiminez Lascano, DUDAS consumers’ association, August 2004.
Aguas Argentinas S.A., Suez Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., Vivendi
Universal S.A. c. República Argentina. Caso Nº ARB/03/19. See also more recently a
similar order in a case involving the British water company Biwater in Tanzania: Biwater
v Tanzania, Case No ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No.5.

50
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IV. CONCLUSION
The case studies summarised in this article show a limited degree of
institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) in the
organisational choices of three Latin American states in the 1990s, each of
whom formally established semi-independent regulatory agencies to
monitor the delivery of water services. These emerged in a context shaped
by the influence of conditional lending by international financial
institutions and of a strong mainstream consensus on the desirability of
transactional regulation. This consensus is embedded in a technocratic
epistemic community whose members include national elites: in other
words, it is national-international coalitions that support a liberalised
management model for global water governance. No story of a
‘transnational’ transformation of the state is ever purely a story of external
moulding.
Having said this, the apparent trajectory of imitative policy developments
noted above is strongly tempered by the evidence presented in the case
studies. This evidence supports two findings: first, national variation in the
type and salience of regulatory dynamics persists despite the existence of
transnationally rooted ‘models’; and secondly, quasi-judicial institutions,
particularly at the local or national level, are better able to respond to the
legitimacy challenges raised by disaffected consumers and citizens than
are regulatory agencies, especially agencies modelled on a transactional
approach.
The first finding of national variation was summarised at the outset of this
paper as divergence in the role played by the regulator in each case:
transactional but marginalised in Bolivia, transactional and politically
salient in Chile, political and erratically salient in Argentina. The
difference can partly be accounted for by the larger political context in
each country: Chile’s stability and foreign-investment-friendly approach,
provincial-federal conflict in Argentina’s divided state, followed by an
economic crisis, and Bolivia’s political and social transformation towards
the left. Whatever the causes of these larger contextual variables,51 they
51

Or the causal effects: it is interesting to note that Evo Morales was involved in protests
around the Cochabamba dispute and that one of the leading water activists in the conflict
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show that transformations of the state can constitute new currents in
globalisation as well as flow from such currents. In particular, the local
support in Bolivia of a political model of regulation may well have
implications for future refinements of aan approach to global water
governance based on participatory democracy. Bolivia’s collaboration
with Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela on the ‘Bolivarian Alternative’
supports such an approach for social services in general, including health,
education and other essential infrastructure apart from water services.
While counterposing the Bolivian story with the Chilean story seems to
contribute to a sense of polarised conflict between models of global water
governance, however, certain aspects of Argentina’s story point towards
compromises that may blend the aspirations of both models, albeit in a
manner that favours managed liberalisation even if it tips rather more
towards management than liberalisation. For example, the capacity for
NGOs and consumer groups to participate in international arbitration
processes first recognised in one of the Argentinian disputes may create
incentives for national and local governments to accord a more systematic
place to consumer and citizen groups in national policymaking processes –
a trajectory encouraged by national-level litigation and political
negotiations by those groups using devices like the recurso de proteccion,
the ombudsman, or human rights provisions in the constitution.
This point leads to the second finding, which is related to the first. The
case studies also reveal some important contributions that local or national
institutions can make to temper polarised conflict in ways that build
bridges between regulatory and citizen space. In no setting can a
regulatory agency by itself generate such constructive politics. In the case
of Bolivia, the agency is politically almost irrelevant to the generation of
these politics; in the case of Argentina, the agency risks sliding into
unproductive political clientilism yet has moments of productive synergy
in its interactions with other institutions. In Chile, ‘bureaucrats with an
entrepreneurial kick’ are constructive up to a point, but limited in the
scope of their capacity to draw in the interests of ordinary citizens.

over water services in La Paz, Abel Mamani, became the first Water Minister for Bolivia
under Morales.
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The lesson here is that even though independent regulatory agencies may
routinise certain technical issues in water service delivery, they can rarely
absorb conflict from direct protest. The technical and apolitical nature of
regulatory discourse is often incommensurable with the value-driven
nature of direct protest. However, quasi-judicial fora such as ombudsmen
or small claims tribunals can link synergistically (and usually in
unintended ways) with regulatory agencies in ways that at least routinise
conflict, allowing winners and losers to emerge incrementally over time
rather than intensifying polarisation in high-stakes rulemaking decisions.
Thus quasi-judicial fora can, up to a point, absorb the ‘missing politics’ in
regulatory dynamics in constructive ways, as was arguably the case in
Argentina. In both Chile and Bolivia, the lack of such fora could be seen
as undermining the overall legitimacy of the water services policy arena,
but in Bolivia only, such discontent found its outlet in mass mobilisation
and direct protest. This again links back to the macro-political context for
each country, which favoured such action in Bolivia but not in Chile.
This finding is limited not only by contingent political contexts, but also
by whether the quasi-judicial institution is locally embedded. The type of
legitimacy deficit that bedevilled the water services investment contracts
explored in this paper is one most intensely felt by local citizens, for
whom an international investment arbitration forum compounds, rather
than tempers, any felt injuries. Of course, transnational companies
investing in longterm service contracts in developing countries may well
feel the opposite: that local and national judicial and quasi-judicial fora
lack the requisite legitimacy. In Argentina, the uneasy compromise of
widening participation rights in international investment arbitration is the
response. But it is not a response that alters the distributive politics at the
root of the conflict, and thus there will always necessarily be a degree of
polarisation around struggles over the appropriate way to govern access to
water issues.52 But this paper has shown that even seemingly domestic
regulatory politics in relation to such struggles have a transnational
dimension. Transnational, however, is precisely neither national nor
international, external nor internal: it is, rather, a hybrid character
embedded in coalitions of local, national and international actors. And
52

Note recent move to Water Operator Partnerships (WOPS) and public-public ventures
as an attempt to build bridges. It is too early to tell if it this will temper the conflicts over
distribution.
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importantly, such coalitions are not restricted to those who support the
managed liberalisation approach to social policy in the context of global
governance. From the currents of conflict over access to water, flow
approaches rooted in participatory democracy in all three case studies
touched upon here, most strongly in Bolivia – and they do so in ways
which constitute new forms of the transnational within the contours of
their own states and beyond.
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